BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 10-245

AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND
Supplement 1

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Operations

AIR FORCE ANTITERRORISM (AT) STANDARDS

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This supplement implements AFI 10-245, Air Force Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, 21 Jun 2002. It expands on the guidance in the Air Force instruction, delineates specific responsibilities, and applies to all organizations within AFMC to include government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities. This Air Force Instruction applies to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) units, when federalized. AFRC and ANG tenants on active Air Force installations with in-place Memorandums of Agreement and Memorandums of Understanding (MOAs/MOUs) shall participate in the host installation antiterrorism/force protection (AT) program. The term "must," "shall," and "will" denote mandatory actions in this supplement. Send comments and suggested improvements on AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication, through unit force protection channels to HQ AFMC/SFO, Building 266, room N208, 4225 Logistics Avenue, Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-5760.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.

AFI 10-245, 21 Jun 2002, is supplemented as follows:

1.1. AFMC AT Program. The AFMC AT program enhances the Department of Defense and Air Force programs of deterrence designed to blunt terrorist acts against personnel and resources by providing timely guidance on collecting and disseminating threat information. This will be accomplished by providing training to all command members, developing comprehensive plans, allocating funds, and implementing defensive measures. The program is an integrated effort where all directors, unit and installation commanders must have the mindset combating terrorism is not solely the responsibility of the Security Forces (SF) and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). Security Forces and AFOSI are merely one component of a comprehensive, successful team effort.

1.1.2.1. (Added) AFMC Installation/Site commanders are responsible for the AT program at their respective installation or site. ASC/CC is responsible for AT at all AF Plants. ASC/CC will ensure vulnerability assessment data is entered into the VAMP and actions required of an installation/site ATO are accomplished at the plants.

1.1.3.1. (Added) Operations Security (OPSEC). The goal of OPSEC is to control information and observable actions about friendly force capabilities, limitations, and intentions so as to prevent or control their exploitation by an adversary. OPSEC must be incorporated throughout the entire AT program. Air Force OPSEC policy can be found in AFI 10-1101 and the AFMC Supplement thereto.

2.1.1.1. AFMC/SF is the OPR and action agency for AFMC AT matters and policy.

2.1.1.1.1. AFMC/CV chairs the Force Protection Senior Steering Group (FPSSG). The AFMC FPSSG is an AFMC multi-disciplined body chartered to meet semi-annually and is responsible for force protection planning, advisory, and policy execution roles for the commander. The FPSSG is comprised of selected leaders, in the grade of 0-6 or above, who have decision authority, representing AFRL, AFOSI, AFSAC, CE, DO, DP, DR, FM, IT, JA, LG, SF, SG, and XP. The FPSSG is made up of four working groups: (1) Antiterrorism Working Group (AFMC/SF), (2) Defensive Counter-Information Working Group (AFMC/IT), (3) Infrastructure Assurance Working Group (AFMC/CE/LG), and (4) Technology Protection Working Group (AFMC/DR and AFOSI Region 1/CC).

2.1.1.1.2. AFMC/IN chairs the Threat Working Group (TWG) and provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG and Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG) with international terrorism expertise, as required.

2.1.1.1.3. AFMC/SF serves as the FPSSG Secretariat, chairs the ATWG, participates in the TWG and provides a team leader and two force protection specialists to the Headquarters Vulnerability Assessment Team (AFMC/VAT).

2.1.1.4. AFMC/SG provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG and ATWG, and a fully qualified operational readiness specialist to support the Headquarters AFMC VAT.

2.1.1.8. AFMC/LG co-chairs the Headquarters Infrastructure Assurance Working Group (IAWG) and provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG to provide logistical expertise, as required.

2.1.1.9. AFMC/CE co-chairs the Headquarters IAWG and provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG and ATWG with civil engineering and WMD expertise, as required. AFMC/CE provides a fully qualified structural and infrastructure engineer and a readiness expert to support the Headquarters AFMC VAT.

2.1.1.11. AFMC Public Affairs Offices will encourage the use of all available internal information resources to support DoD directed briefings and training. Such resources include, but are not limited to: installation marquees, bulletin boards, official publications, commercial enterprise newspapers, internal computer Local Area Networks (LAN) and installation television assets such as the commander's Access Channel. Create a generic news release coordinated with the installation/site commander that is applicable to terrorist incidents. Maintain liaison with local media.

2.1.1.12. AFMC/JA provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG and ATWG to provide legal expertise, as required.

2.1.1.13. AFOSI (1 FIR) co-chairs the Headquarters Technology Protection Working Group (TPWG) and provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG, ATWG and TWG to provide

counterintelligence expertise, as required. 1 FIR provides a fully qualified terrorist options specialist to support the Headquarters AFMC VAT.

2.1.1.14. The Headquarters Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG) consisting of representatives from , AFOSI, CE, DO, IG, IN, IT, JA, PA, SF, SG, and XP is AFMC/CC's advisory body on AT policy and program management. The ATWG is charged with the overall effectiveness of the command's force protection program. SF serves as Chairperson of the ATWG. Within the ATWG, AFOSI, IN and SF make up the Threat Working Group and are responsible for assessing and disseminating threat information.

2.1.1.14.1. (Added) AFMC/XP provides core members to the Headquarters FPSSG and ATWG with plans expertise, as required.

2.1.1.14.2. (Added) AFMC/DP provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG with personnel expertise, as required.

2.1.1.14.3. (Added) AFMC/DR co-chairs the TPWG and provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG with acquisition expertise, as required.

2.1.1.14.4. (Added) AFMC/FM provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG with financial expertise, as required.

2.1.1.14.5. (Added) AFMC/IG provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG and ATWG with force protection inspection expertise, as required.

2.1.1.14.6. (Added) AFMC/IT chairs the Defensive Counter-Information Working Group (DCIWG) and provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG and ATWG with information assurance expertise, as required.

2.1.1.14.7. (Added) HQ AFMC/DO provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG and ATWG with operational expertise, as required.

2.1.1.14.8. (Added) HQ AFRL provides a core member to the Headquarters FPSSG with research and development expertise, as required.

2.1.1.14.9. (Added) HQ AFMC/PA provides a core member to the Headquarters ATWG with public affairs expertise, as required.

2.2.1.4.1. AFMC Installation/Site Commanders must budget for force protection requirements through the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.

2.2.1.4.1.1. (Added) Submit budget requirements to HQ AFMC/SFX annually (during October) and update six months after submission (during April) if required, using the suggested format (Attachment 9). The installation AT decision making body (The ISC) and the Wing Commander should review all budget submissions and approve them before submission to HQ AFMC/SFX. Action officers preparing the budget submittal must research funding amounts, and ensure the requested amounts are firm and executable. Ensure proper coordination for facility projects is obtained from Civil Engineering and a project number assigned prior to submission. Budget requests must have a direct AT application with wide-ranging impact.

2.3.4. Commanders and directorate heads are responsible for the implementation of DoD AT policies within their organization. The term "Commanders" refers to those individuals in the chain of command from AFMC/CC down to the installation/site/unit level for permanent and temporary operations or locations.

2.3.4.2. Through the public affairs program, installations are tasked with providing periodic AT awareness on terrorist threats and personnel protection principles and techniques to the base populace. This may be satisfied using base newspaper articles or flyers distributed at accessible points throughout the installation. Incidents of terrorism and crime will generate external media interest. In response to queries concerning a possible or real terrorist threat at a particular activity, installation, or community, the commander may acknowledge that increased security measures have been or will be taken without going into specific details regarding the measures being taken. In other words, it may be appropriate and operationally sound to acknowledge the obvious. For example, increased security measures such as additional guards at the gate and/or more stringent identification checks are usually obvious to the public, and acknowledgement may serve to send a positive message of increased readiness. Commanders must exercise care and prudent judgment in any discussion of these or other security measures to preclude revealing tactics and techniques that an adversary could exploit. Practice good operations security (OPSEC).

2.5.3. Ensure local support planning efforts consider Threat Levels 1 and 2 (AFI 31-301, *Air Base Defense*), as well as the known criminal threat in the immediate area of the installation. Installation/Site Commanders will ensure all agreements for local emergency support: e.g., fire, police, medical, etc., are formally coordinated for installations/sites. Review of agreements is a part of the AT vulnerability assessment process.

2.5.4.2.1. (Added) The reporting period for the FP Performance Measure 2.A.12, Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program, is 1 Oct through 31 Mar, and 1 Apr through 30 September. Installations/sites must report the status of their AT plan to HQ AFMC/SFO NLT 5 Oct and 5 Apr of each year.

2.6.1. Installation placement of the ATO and alternate at AFMC installation/sites is at the commander's discretion. The person appointed primary and alternate ATO may be an officer, NCO (E-6 or higher), DoD civilian, or for those installations/sites with contracted security, a DoD contractor. Once the ATO and alternate have been designated, forward a courtesy copy of the appointment letter containing the person's name, security clearance, duty phone number and e-mail address to HQ AFMC/SF. Update appointment letters as changes occur. In addition, the installation/site commander will ensure those selected as ATOs attend Level II training within 90 days of appointment.

2.6.1.1. (Added) Host AFMC units will identify base organizations requiring ATOs at center, squadron level and below to serve as the unit/organization AT subject matter expert and advisor. Once the primary and alternate ATO have been designated, forward a courtesy copy of the appointment letter containing the names, security clearances, duty phone numbers and e-mail addresses to the Installation ATO. Update appointment letters as changes occur; pen and ink changes are not authorized.

2.6.2.1. (Added) Installation Commanders must budget for training to meet their Level II training requirement to ensure proper coverage of overseas deployments. AFMC/SF will only fund Level II training for the installation ATO and alternate.

2.6.3.1. (Added) Installation/Site Commanders will provide HQ AFMC/SF a copy of their supplement within 120 days from the date of this supplement.

2.6.4.4.1. (Added) Schedule and attend quarterly FPWG meetings.

2.6.4.9. ATOs will document the review process in Block 14 of the AF Form 332, Base Civil Engineer work request. AFMC/CEC will provide AFMC/SFO all DoD Forms 1391, Military Construction Project Data, for review regarding Force Protection issues.

2.6.4.13. (Added) Manage the Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (VAMP) for the installation.

2.7.3. Commanders shall use intelligence (to include terrorist, criminal and other potential threats, as well as the security environment of the local area) as a tool in developing/updating plans and programs to protect assets within their installation or site.

2.10. Reports will be sent directly to HQ AFMC/SFO who will forward the information to AFSFC/SFP.

2.10.1.1. (Added) Installation/site commanders are responsible for coordinating with the appropriate intelligence/counterintelligence organization at or near their installation to collect, analyze, and disseminate terrorist threat information pertaining to the potential terrorist use of WMD. Commanders at all levels shall ensure personnel under their command properly report information on events, or situations that could pose a threat to the security of DoD personnel and resources.

2.10.2.1. (Added) AFOSI Region 1 will ensure Region 1 servicing AFOSI Detachments incorporate WMD threat assessments in the annual installation threat assessment. Copies of these assessments will be furnished to HQ AFMC/SFO.

2.10.2.1.1. (Added) As a part of the overall installation/site AT plan, commanders should address the WMD threat and exercise the WMD part of the plan to determine its effectiveness in mitigating the effects of an attack. In addition to providing crisis action and consequence management procedures, planning should include pre-attack measures and consideration for collateral damage a WMD may have on adjacent facilities and surrounding communities. Plans should provide sufficient detail to permit organizations to rapidly recognize and respond to any terrorist event using WMD. Attachment 10 provides additional crisis action planning considerations that should be included in addressing terrorist use of WMD.

2.13.2.1. Installation/Site Commanders may implement higher FPCONs based on local conditions. Downward directed FPCON changes for AFMC units will come through the AFMC Command Post. Tenants will comply with the host FPCON, regardless of the FPCON implemented by their parent command. Tenants may increase security at their respective facilities through use of an expanded RAM program, coordinating with the host security organization. There should only be one FPCON on AFMC bases with final determination by the installation/site commander.

2.17.1. As a part of the response plan, commanders are encouraged to develop a set of recognizable alarms for potential emergencies. Each alarm should have its own set of reactions, a means to immediately sound the alarm, and commanders should conduct frequent drills to familiarize all personnel with individual responsibilities during a potential emergency.

2.19.1.1. Installation-wide antiterrorism exercises (both operational and command post) will be conducted annually, as a minimum. Conducting and evaluating these exercises together may fulfill this requirement. The exercises will be used to test and evaluate the installation's ability to respond to the local terrorist threat. Exercises will test a broad range of required FPCON actions specified within the installation's local plans and may be combined with other base exercises such as a MARE, BROKEN ARROW, etc.

2.19.1.4. Installation/site commanders will ensure training and exercises are conducted annually IAW AT plans to include all FPCON measures, evacuation/notification plans and procedures, terrorist use of WMD, and other key areas outlined in their installation's AT plans.

2.19.1.5.(Added) Responses to real world WMD situations can be used to meet the required exercise criteria as long as all primary offices participate, a report is generated, an after actions group reviews the event for lessons learned and it is approved by the installation commander.

2.22. AFMC organizations must consider AT training for contractors where these personnel are permanently assigned or perform temporary duty overseas. Contracting documents shall direct the contractor to conduct and document Level I Antiterrorism Awareness Training for these personnel prior to departure for overseas travel. DoDD 2000.12, Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT) Program, and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, DFARS 252.225-7042/7043, reflects current DoD AT guidance for defense contractors.

2.22.7.1. The reporting period for the FP Performance Measure 2.A.14, Implementation and Tracking of Level I Antiterrorism Training, is 1 Oct through 31 Mar and 1 Apr through 30 September. Installations/ sites must report the status of their implementation and tracking of Level I Antiterrorism Training to HQ AFMC/SFO NLT 5 Oct and 5 Apr of each year.

2.23.3.1. (Added) Commanders are responsible to ensure procedures are in effect that will prohibit the issuance of orders for overseas travel (deployed, PCS, TDY or leave) for those personnel who have not received Level I AT training with special emphasis on AOR-specific threat and medical threats.

2.24.1.1. (Added) Units needing Level II training will schedule the requirement with HQ AFMC/SFXR. Personnel selected to attend the Level II course must be prioritized as follows: (1) installation ATO and alternate, (2) key leadership assigned to UTCs, and (3) other specialties on the installation key to successful UTC deployment, i.e., combat logistics, communications, prime beef, medical personnel and other unique teams. Submit prioritized Level II training requests to HQ AFMC/SFXR under wing commander or equivalent signature. Requests for primary and alternate ATOs must include full name, rank/grade, SSN, security clearance, and duty phone to facilitate training preparation. The Combating Terrorism on Military Installations Course has been renamed and is now called the Antiterrorism Officer Course, and is the same course number, L50ZA31P3 011.

2.24.2. (Added) The source for ATO Level II training is HQ AFMC/SF's RTC, the 96th Readiness Training Squadron "Brave Defender" Program Mobile Training Team (MTT). HQ AFMC/SFOF will fund the primary/alternate ATO for attending AFMC's Level II MTT at the hosting AFMC base as scheduled at HQ AFMC/SF website: https://www.afmc-mil.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/SF/

2.24.2.1.1. HQ AFMC/SFXR is OPR for course validation requirements of AFMC's AT Level II MTT course.

2.24.4.1. (Added) Once AFMC members complete AFMC AT Level II (MTT), they will update their certificates into the Oracle Training Administrator (OTA) via their home station Education and Training Flight (ETF) Offices. The hosting AFMC ATO will consolidate names of all attendees and forward to the 96th RTS AT Level II OPR for entry into command database maintained by RTS staff.

2.24.7. The 96th RTS is the OPR for all recurring reports to HQ AFSFC/SFP.

2.24.9.3. HQ AFMC/DP will develop a tracking system to determine those personnel not able to attend the AFMC Squadron Commanders' Course. AFMC/DP will provide the names of those personnel (rank, unit, SSN, and DSN) to HQ AFMC/SFXR. AFMC/SFXR will seek a Level III training quota for these individuals from the AFSOC Special Operations School. Training quotas will be unit funded.

2.24.10.1. Contact HQ AFMC/DPO, DSN 787-2729, for AF Level IV training quotas.

2.26.1.1. Installation/Site Commanders must address, and attempt to correct AT vulnerabilities identified during local and higher headquarter vulnerability assessments; especially those that are procedural or relatively inexpensive and would improve the AT posture. Conversely, high cost improvements must be considered in context with threat and risk assessment, and if necessary, planned for, and programmed.

2.26.2.1. ATOs shall forward a copy of their local installation vulnerability assessment report to HQ AFMC/SFO within 60 days after the assessment.

2.26.2.1.1. Results of the assessment must be documented and maintained on file for review by higher headquarters assessment officials pursuant to DoD Standard 26.

2.26.3. HQ AFMC will conduct independent vulnerability assessments of AFMC installation/sites in addition to those conducted by the AF team and the JSIVA. VAs must ensure all tenant organizations (on the installation/site or remote but administratively attached) are integrated into the force protection plan and afforded the same level of FP support as AFMC units. AFMC vulnerability assessments are not required to physically assess every single activity on the installation, but instead must assess an appropriate number that will indicate a prudent level of FP is in place for the entire installation/site. As a minimum, each commander or director shall prioritize, track and report to the next general/flag officer or civilian equivalent, the action to be taken to address vulnerabilities identified in the vulnerability assessment.

2.26.5. HQ AFMC/SF schedules JSIVA, AF and AFMC vulnerability assessments of AFMC installations and sites through HQ AFSFC/SFP. The schedule will be coordinated with the HQ AFMC/IG Gatekeeper and the respective installation /site commander.

2.26.8. As a minimum, assessments should include information from intelligence, logistics, medical, physical security, facility engineering, meteorological, explosive ordnance disposal, and NBC staff elements. The entire range of potential terrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use should be considered when conducting assessments. Threats from commercial chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological sources should be included as well as traditional military agents. Examples of vulnerabilities include: (1) Individual protective clothing and equipment, (2) Collective protection equipment and facilities, (3) Medical response and emergency services capability, (4) Training of personnel, (5) Physical security and protective barriers, (6) Facility design and construction, (7) Early warning and detection, (8) Alarms and attack warning, (9) Threat intelligence, (10) Preventive medicine and vaccination programs, (11) Sustainment operations and follow on support, (12) Storage of bulk hazardous material, (13) Explosive ordnance disposal response capability/availability and (14) Food and water sources.

2.26.10. AFMC VAT composition may vary based on the type of site or installation being assessed. The assessment team shall consist of a team chief (SF lead), force protection specialist (two), structural engineer, infrastructure engineer, operational readiness specialist (one each for medical and civil engineering readiness) and a terrorist options specialist. Other functional experts may augment the team as needed. Augmentation will depend on type of assessment required, the nature of the installation's/site's mission, the terrorist threat level, and the FPCON. Assessments may require expertise in preventive medicine, linguistics, chemical/biological/radiological weapons effects, emerging AT technology,

explosive ordnance disposal, Information Operations (IO), special warfare, or other specialties as determined by the commander or directed by HQ AFMC/SF. Regardless of team composition, the team must have expertise in these areas: (1) Physical Security, (2) Structural Engineering (Weapons Effect Specialist), (3) Operational Readiness, (4) Law Enforcement and Security Force Operations, (5) Infrastructure Engineering, and (6) Counterintelligence/Intelligence.

2.26.10.1. FIST support requests will be submitted to HQ AFMC/SFOF who will send the request to HQ AFSFC/SFP.

2.26.12. Installation appointment letters will be sent to HQ AFMC/SFOFV who will forward the information to AFSFC/SFP.

2.26.19. The reporting period for the FP Performance Measure 2.A.13, Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program Assessments, is 1 Oct through 31 Mar, and 1 Apr through 30 Sept. Installations/sites must report the status of their AT Program Assessments to HQ AFMC/SFO NLT 5 Oct and 5 Apr of each year.

2.27.2.1. (Added) Persons conducting site-selection environmental risk assessments will be fully qualified Bioenvironmental Engineers (43E3) and/or Public Health Officers (43H3) or other qualified medical personnel.

2.28.2.1.1. (Added) The installation/site SF may convene the ATWG to seek additional expertise from this forum in the review and coordination of new construction projects and existing building rehabilitation plans.

2.30.1.1. Consider using the CARVER matrix when conducting criticality and vulnerability assessments. Descriptions of the CARVER matrix and its use are contained in tab 3 of the Jul 98 J-34 Combating Terrorism AT Installation Planning Template, Air Force Handbook 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills,* and Field Manual 31-20-5, *Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces.*

2.30.2.1.1. (Added) Installation/Site Commanders will develop procedures for coordinating with local/ federal authorities for the protection of personnel residing in off-installation housing, and ensure all DoD personnel receive the following guidance for selecting private residences to mitigate risk of terrorist attack. A Housing Office should be the installation/site commander's executive agent to ensure guidance is provided.

2.30.2.1.1.1. (Added) Give preference to residences that maximize safety and security while minimizing the need for security upgrades.

2.30.2.1.1.2. (Added) For single family residences, preferences should be given to those with a perimeter barrier, such as a wall or fence that deters access to the property.

2.30.2.1.1.3. (Added) Preference should be given to residences with off street parking, and ideally secured in some manner.

2.30.2.1.1.4. (Added) Entrance areas and apartment hallways should be illuminated.

2.30.2.1.1.5. (Added) Entrances should have a substantial door (good solid door and the door frame should be well constructed).

2.30.2.1.1.6. (Added) Each entrance should have a capability to permit the occupant to identify visitors without opening the door.

2.30.2.1.1.7. (Added) Each entrance should have a deadbolt lock. A double cylinder lock should be used if placed within 40 inches of a glass side light or door window: fire safety rules should be considered when installing this type of lock.

2.30.2.1.1.8. (Added) Accessible window/openings should have a latching or locking mechanism.

2.30.2.1.1.9. (Added) Significant and High Threat Level Areas will also include the following (optional at lower threat levels):

2.30.2.1.1.9.1. (Added) Residences have multiple access routes to arterial roads should be given preference.

2.30.2.1.1.9.2. (Added) Grounds adjacent to the building faÁade and all entrance areas and apartment hallways should be illuminated.

2.30.2.1.1.9.3. (Added) Grills deemed adequate for local conditions are required on all accessible ground floor windows/openings where patterns of violence commonly used force entry. Existing window barriers such as roll-down or hinged shutters or alarmed openings can preclude the need for grills.

2.30.2.1.1.9.4. (Added) Grilled residences above the fourth floor require a secondary means of escape.

2.30.2.1.1.9.5. (Added) Residences should be alarmed to protect accessible window/openings and doors.

2.30.2.1.1.9.6. (Added) A safe haven should be considered where the threat includes forced entry into residences accompanied by physical harm to an occupant residences above the first floor are excluded.

2.30.5.1. (Added) AFMC assigned forces located within or transiting geographical CINC AORs will comply with that CINC's established requirements and guidance governing off-installation billeting.

2.31.3. The FPSSG, based on threat information provided by AFOSI (1 FIR), will recommend to AFMC/CC for approval those positions that should be considered high-risk billets.

2.31.3.1. (Added) Installation/Site Commanders shall consult with their servicing AFOSI detachment if executive protection and protective services are needed.

Chapter 3 (ADDED)

DOD ANTITERRORISM AWARDS PROGRAM

3.1. (Added) DoD AT Recognition Program Awards. Each year, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC) recognizes outstanding AT efforts and installation programs that clearly set precedence in the field of AT.

3.1.1. (Added) Units wishing to submit nomination packages for these awards must forward them to HQ AFMC/SFXR no later than 20 February of the current calendar year.

3.2. (Added) Nomination packages should include accomplishments covering the previous calendar year. HQ AFMC/SFXR will forward specific details and a notification message to AFMC units each year.

Attachment 9 (Added)

INSTALLATIONS AND SUPPORT MISSION AREA

FY03 Requirements/FY04 Mission Area Operating Plan (MAOP)/APOM
HQ AFMC Security Forces Centrally Managed Program Requirements
Anti-Terrorism (PEC 28047)

Base _____

PEC	APPN	EEIC	EEIC TITLE	FY02	FY03		FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08
28047F	3400	40900	Travel/Training								
28047F	3400	52900	Facility Modifications								
28047F	3400	61900	Supplies/Equipment								
28047F			**TOTAL**	**$0**	**$0**		**$0**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**	**$0**

COMMANDER'S STATEMENT/COMMENTS:

FY02:

FY03:

FY04:

FY05:

FY06:

FY07:

FY08:

FY09:

Attachment 10 (ADDED)

WMD CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

A10.1. (Added) Commander's Estimate of the Potential Use of WMD. This forms the basis for all facts and assumptions that drive the planning and preparation for any use of WMD by potential threat organizations. As such, the commander's estimate is the cornerstone of any successful program and must be reviewed frequently to incorporate any new or emerging threat.

A10.2. (Added) Type/Number of Threats. Accurate identification of the WMD threats posed by terrorist organizations provides a mechanism to determine the resources needed to counter the threat and respond effectively if they are used. Planners should also factor in the magnitude and diversity of the threats throughout an AOR.

A10.3. (Added) Most Likely/Most Vulnerable Targets. Most organizations can't provide total protection for all personnel and facilities in their AOR. However, identification of the most likely and vulnerable targets enables more detailed planning, which then drives responsible organizations to improve security measures. Further, responsible organizations can take measures to improve the security for these areas.

A10.4. (Added) Target Value Analysis. Certain areas pose different challenges from those above due to their specific value to terrorists. These targets may not be mission related or of high military value, but their value to terrorists may be very high. High use areas, such as shopping facilities or office complexes, have inherent problems with access control and usually have large concentrations of unprotected personnel present. Special analysis and planning should be done to help reduce the vulnerability of these type areas. This analysis must be conducted by fusing all available sources of information on the terrorist organizations.

A10.5. (Added) Coordination With Local Authorities. Coordination with local authorities is essential when planning for terrorist WMD use. It is likely that an attack on either the DoD facility or the local civilian populace will affect both communities. Dispersion of the agent affects by environmental factors (wind, water, or animals) can quickly spread to surrounding areas. Thorough coordination between DoD organizations and local officials provides a means to improve the response time and offers the opportunity to share critical resources needed to mitigate the effects of an attack.

A10.6. (Added) Attack Recognition And Agent Characterization. Unless prior warning is obtained of an impending attack, most organizations will not have automatic detection devices and alarms in operation. Attack recognition may come only when symptoms first appear in exposed personnel. Agent identification will probably be done by first responders or medical personnel. Planning must address this potential vulnerability and incorporate procedures that minimize the delay from attack initiation until detection.

A10.7. (Added) Warning Systems. Because WMD attacks can cover large areas, timely warning can reduce the number of personnel who would otherwise be exposed to agent effects. A combination of outdoor warning sirens, telephonic notification, and broadcast announcements provide redundant warning systems that will reach a large portion of the population. Special consideration should be given to unique populations, such as the visually or hearing impaired, to ensure effective warning systems are in place to provide for their safety.

A10.8. (Added) Response Levels. Different agents require different responses. Plans should include details on the appropriate response for the agents identified in the commander's assessment and the equipment needed to implement that level of response.

A10.9. (Added) Hazardous Material Response Teams. Federal, state and local regulations have specific requirements for personnel responding to hazardous material and substances. Commanders must be aware of these requirements and emergency responders must have the equipment and training necessary to protect themselves, treat casualties and decontaminate the site. Planning should include adequate time and resources to ensure response teams have the appropriate equipment and level of training.

A10.10. (Added) Reporting Procedures. Because of the sensitivity of terrorist use of WMD, many agencies require formatted reports on the nature of the event. Plans should include preformatted templates for reporting requirements; message addresses and phone numbers for the agencies and commands that must be notified. Communications can rapidly overload available communications means during a crisis. Brevity codes, established crisis action communication procedures and predetermined local reporting requirements will all assist in the management of a crisis by providing timely and accurate information to the emergency operations center.

A10.11. (Added) Crisis Action Team Responsibilities. Emergency operations centers normally have only a small staff on duty and will require immediate augmentation when an attack occurs. Staff elements should be fully trained and prepared to implement the appropriate plan to reduce the effects of the WMD attack. It may be necessary to operate in protective equipment during the initial stage of the crisis. Training on the use of protective equipment and their specific duties as part of the emergency operations center staff should be regularly exercised to maintain proficiency in crisis action responsibilities.

A10.12. (Added) First Responder Responsibilities. First responders will be called on to perform many critical functions during a WMD attack. Law enforcement, fire, medical, explosive ordnance disposal and facility engineer teams will usually be some of the first organizations to react to an event. Careful planning and training is needed to address the special needs of these groups. The actions they take during the initial stages of an event will have a very important impact on the consequence management steps that follow.

A10.13. (Added) Medical Support Treatment and Transportation Requirements. Prior coordination with state and local medical facilities is necessary to ensure medical plans include procedures to treat and care for contaminated or infected personnel. Personnel who treat contaminated casualties or handle contaminated remains require special training. Medical facilities should have areas designated to treat and segregate contaminated patients. Preventive medicine specialists and pathologists need to have a database of naturally occurring diseases and procedures to quickly assess and identify suspicious illnesses and diseases. Antidotes and treatments for potential agents from commercial or industrial sources should be considered in the casualty management plan. Contaminated patient transport and contamination control measures should be incorporated into litter and ambulance operations.

A10.14. (Added) Temporary Shelters, Evacuation Routes and Care Centers. There will always be a requirement to clear an area and provide orderly evacuation to safe areas when WMD is used. Temporary shelters, evacuation routes, and care centers should be identified during the planning process. Commanders should identify facilities for potential use in defense against chemical, radiological, and biological agents. Existing facilities may be suitable for adaptation as temporary shelters/toxic-free areas, since sufficient collective protection resources may be inadequate. Law enforcement and security

personnel need to determine traffic control points to facilitate evacuation and prevent personnel from entering potentially contaminated areas. Copies of the routes and locations of care centers should be available to installation workers and residents.

A10.15. (Added) Public Affairs. The demand for information from the public and the media will be intense at the onset of an event. Public affairs planning should include dissemination of background information on the potential agents and materials that pose a threat. Basic information on the properties, effects, treatment, duration, and decontamination of likely threat agents should be included in the public affairs reference materials brought to the emergency operations center and joint information center. Rapid and accurate information on the hazard during the early stages of an event will assist in protecting civilians from the hazard and foster confidence in DoD's ability to safely manage the crisis.

A10.16. (Added) Crime Scene Procedures For Agent Material. Terrorist use of any WMD material is a criminal act. Local plans should include procedures to control a crime scene in a contaminated environment and provide for the recovery of evidence that may be hazardous. For domestic events, the FBI will be responsible for investigating the criminal incident. Law enforcement and security plans should provide procedures to facilitate the transition of responsibility when FBI arrives on site.

A10.17. (Added) Follow-on Assistance. Any WMD event will generate the requirements for some form of external support or assistance. Plans should determine the type, amount and time frame for follow-on assistance. The logistics of managing a large contingent of external support organizations has the potential of over-whelming the ability of the local commander to control its effective employment.

A10.18. (Added) Hazard Prediction. When an event occurs, there is an immediate need to predict the size of the potential hazard zone. Reports from first responders will contain the location of the incident site; but the initial estimate of the hazard area should be made by emergency operations center personnel. Procedures should be incorporated into emergency operations centers that allow for a quick initial hazard prediction and methods for its rapid dissemination. Detailed predictions can be made when more information is provided on the agent type and dissemination means.

A10.19. (Added) Meteorological Support. As indicated above, hazard prediction must be done quickly. Current and reliable weather data is critical to providing accurate hazard predictions. Updated weather data should be routinely provided to emergency operations centers so that it is available at the onset of an event. Organizations providing data should be part of the planning process so they can develop weather products that support hazard prediction models or programs.

A10.20. (Added) Contamination Control. Containing and limiting the spread of contamination is essential in reducing the effects of a WMD attack. Procedures for personnel responding to the attack site should include methods that minimize their direct contact with contaminated material. Work crews should use sumps to collect runoff from decontamination operations. Access into the site should be through designated points and along designated routes.

A10.21. (Added) Decontamination and Hot Line Operations. Decontamination procedures should be developed using the resources locally available. Decontaminating exposed personnel, first responders, and site work teams requires the rapid establishment of a decontamination site. Plans should consider the requirement to maintain decontamination operations for extended periods and the potentially large personnel and logistics need generated to support this type of operation.

A10.22. (Added) Sampling and Analysis. Sampling will be required at the attack site and in the predicted hazard areas to establish the presence or absence of contamination. Plans should include procedures to determine sampling requirements and protocols for the collection of agent material.

Analysis may be done locally at the onset of an attack, but may be shipped off-site for confirmation or for detailed analysis if local facilities cannot identify the material.

A10.23. (Added) Monitoring Operations. Monitoring plans should include procedures to employ detection equipment to known or suspected hazard locations. Detection equipment intended for military tactical level employment may not detect agent concentrations that are considered hazardous by the EPA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. Environmental and safety planners must be aware of the hazardous material exposure limits of civilian populations and understand the limitations of using military equipment to determine when areas are considered free of contamination.

A10.24. (Added) Reentry and Remediation Operations. Preliminary planning should address the considerations for these operations. Reentry includes actions required to permit personnel to safely enter an area following an attack. Remediation includes actions to remove all contamination from the site and restore the environment to its original condition. Both of these processes can potentially take several days to weeks to complete. External support will probably be needed to ensure these tasks are properly accomplished.

A10.25. (Added) Training. Training programs should provide a comprehensive approach to meeting the needs identified in mitigation efforts. Actions required to reduce the vulnerability to attack and to respond as the result of a terrorist WMD incident involve many different tasks and levels of training. At a minimum, training programs should include individual, first responder, functional response team, and emergency operations center training.

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